The multi-leader-follower game serves as an important model in game theory with many applications in economics, operations research and other fields. In this survey paper, we first recall some background materials in game theory and optimization. In particular, we present several extensions of Nash equilibrium problems including the multi-leader-follower game. We then give some applications as ...

The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash equilibrium problem and the Stackelberg game, which contains several leaders and a number of followers. Recently, the multi-leader-follower game has been drawing more and more attention, for example, in electricity power markets. However, when we formulate a general multi-leader-follower game as a single-level game,...

we model a real-world case problem as a price competition model between two leader-follower supply chains that each of them consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. t he manufacturer produces partially differentiated products and sells to market through his retailer. the retailer sells the products of manufacturer to market by adding some values to the product and gains margin as a fracti...

This paper develops a decentralized leader-follower game for network design of a competitive supply chain problem in which a new chain as the leader enters a market with one existing supply chain as a follower. Both chains produce an identical product, customer demand is inelastic and customer utility function is based on Huff gravity-based model. The leader wants to shape his network and set a...

In Stackelberg games, a “leader” player first chooses a mixed strategy to commit to, then a “follower” player responds based on the observed leader strategy. Notable strides have been made in scaling up the algorithms for such games, but the problem of finding optimal leader strategies spanning multiple rounds of the game, with a Bayesian prior over unknown follower preferences, has been left u...

We investigate the solvability of the reverse Stackelberg game. Here, a leader player acts first by presenting a leader function that maps the follower decision space into the leader decision space. Subsequently, the follower acts by determining his optimal decision variable. Such a game setting can be adopted within a multi-level optimization approach for large-scale control problems like road...

We model a real-world case problem as a price competition model between two leader-follower supply chains that each of them consists of one manufacturer and one retailer. T he manufacturer produces partially differentiated products and sells to market through his retailer. The retailer sells the products of manufacturer to market by adding some values to the product and gains margin as a fracti...

Using a traditional leader-follower decisional sequence as the manifestation of power structure in a supply chain, this work generalizes extant research in IT security. We propose a game theoretic model to analyze the equilibrium IT security of the supply chain in the Stackelberg game, where the power structure in the supply chain manifests in a natural leader. Our results indicate that a natur...

Multi-leader multi-follower games are a class of hierarchical games in which a collection of leaders compete in a Nash game constrained by the equilibrium conditions of another Nash game amongst the followers. Much of the extant research on this topic is either model specific or relies on weaker notions of equilibria. We observe that when this original game is modified to ensure that the leader...

A basic model of commitment is to convert a game in strategic form into a “leadership game” where one player commits to a strategy to which the other player chooses a best response, with payoffs as in the original game. This paper studies subgame perfect equilibria of such leadership games for the mixed extension of a finite game, where the leader commits to a mixed strategy. In a generic two-p...